Armenian National Institute
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December 26, 2022
1. Starting from December 12, 2022, at around 10:30 am (GMT+4), a group of Azerbaijanis in civilian clothes, posing as alleged environmental activists blocked the only road (Goris-Stepanakert highway which passes through the Berdzor (Lachin corridor) connecting Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh, hereafter Artsakh) to Armenia, and to the world, in violation of the obligations assumed by Azerbaijan through trilateral ceasefire statement of November 9, 2020.
2. In accordance with Point 6 of the Statement: (...) “The Lachin corridor (5 km wide) which will ensure the communication between Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)/Artsakh and Armenia and at the same time will circumvent the city of Shushi, shall remain under the control of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation”
3. The Azerbaijani side violates the provisions of the Statement and thus fails to fulfill its international obligations assumed by it.
4. The road, which is under the control of the Russian Peacekeeping contingent, is used only for passage of people and goods intended for the civilian population of Artsakh. This act has resulted in the blocking and stopping of the movement of people, and food and medical supplies and other vital goods.
5. This is the second attempt of the Azerbaijani side to block the Lachin corridor. Previously, on December 3, 2022, a group of Azerbaijanis, posing as environmental activists, had blocked the Lachin corridor again, under fabricated ecological concerns, mainly the exploitation of mines by Artsakh. As a result of negotiations, the road was reopened.
6. As a direct result of the blocking of the road, 120,000 people have appeared under complete blockade and siege. Additionally, in cold winter conditions, 1100 persons, including older persons, women, and 270 children have been stranded on the road in the Stepanakert-Sushi and Lisagor-Sushi sectors of the Goris-Stepanakert highway. Additionally, several communities of the Shushi region have been completely isolated and cut off from the rest of Artsakh and Armenia, including the communities of Lisagor, Mets Shen, Hin Shen and Eghtsahogh.
7. As the Lachin corridor is the only road connecting Artsakh with Armenia and the outside world, as of great humanitarian importance, its blocking is causing, and will further cause, grave humanitarian consequences. Currently, food, medical and energy supplies to Artsakh are completely stopped. About 400 tons of essential goods, including grain, flour, vegetables, fruits, economic goods, etc., are imported to Artsakh from Armenia daily. On December 25 10 tons of humanitarian aid was transferred to Artsakh through ICRC.
8. Moreover, according to the information provided by the Stepanakert Republican Medical Center and the Ministry of Healthcare of Artsakh, due to the continuous blocking of the Lachin corridor, the transfer of patients in critical condition for urgent treatment and hospitalization in the specialized medical centers of Armenia has become impossible. There have been 2 cases, when with the support of ICRC patients were transferred to Armenia.
9. On December 21, 2022, the alleged environmental activists did not allow a column of Kamaz trucks, belonging to the Russian peacekeepers to pass through the corridor, again violating the provisions of the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020, which states that the corridor shall remain under the control of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation. The statement also stipulates Azerbaijan to guarantee traffic safety along the Lachin Corridor of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions.
10. Moreover, on December 14, 2002, at around 6:00 pm, the Azerbaijani authorities cut the natural gas supply to Artsakh, during these severe winter conditions, depriving the peaceful population of Artsakh from heating, hot water, and other basic necessities. As a result of the cut of the only natural gas pipeline, medical institutions in Artsakh are unable to provide primary medical care, the educational process in the educational institutions of Artsakh has been stopped, the work of state bodies and agencies have been disrupted, and there has been a lack of fuels for vehicles, etc. The gas supply was restored on December 16.
11. The disruption of the supply of natural gas to Artsakh as a method of war and ethnic cleansing of the peaceful civilian population, has already been employed by the Azerbaijani authorities earlier in 2022. In particular, on March 2022, under the guise of repair works of a gas pipeline (transfering gas from Armenia to Artsakh, which crosses regions occupied by Azerbaijan during the 44-day war of 2020) which had allegedly exploded, the Azerbaiajni installed a valve on the pipeline, with the intention of turning it off at any given time. After the alleged repair works, the Azerbaijani side disrupted the supply of natural gas.
12. The governments and international actors involved in the resolution of the conflict should use all possible diplomatic measures to stop the siege and blockade of Artsakh, restore the natural gas supply, and stop the impending humanitarian disaster and to guarantee the rights of the people living in Artsakh. The international community should urgently take a unanimous and unambiguous stance, as well as targeted actions to condemn, punish and prevent Azerbaijan from continuing to act with a sense of absolute impunity and realizing its ultimate goal – the depopulation of Artsakh from its native Armenian population and their eventual extermination.
13. Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, extermination, defined as including “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia, the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population”, constitutes a crime against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.
14. Moreover, “wilfully impeding relief supplies” as part of the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is a war crime in international armed conflicts.
15. The blockade of Artsakh is not an isolated episode but must be seen as part of widespread and systematic policy of Azerbaijan aimed at complete expulsion of the people of Artsakh from their native land. Since the establishment of the ceasefire guaranteed by the Trilateral Statement of November 9, 2020, Artsakh’s Ombudsman has repeatedly reported on the recurrence of similar threats and provocations from the Azerbaijani side. Over the past two years, Azerbaijan inter alia has:
16. The data of this report reflects updated facts of December 12-25, 2022. During the 14 days blockade of the Lachin corridor the Offices of HRDs of Armenia and Artsakh has been updating the information about the humanitarian situation on the ground (see Annex 4)
17. On December 14 the CoE Secretary General Marija Pejčinović Burić expressed concern for the humanitarian situation around the Lachin Corridor. Giuseppe Zaffuto, Spokesperson for the CoE Secretary General, has stated. “Dialogue is key to avoid escalating tensions. CoE is ready to assist reconciliation efforts between Armenia & Azerbaijan through confidence-building measures.
18. On December 15 The Freedom House has called on the international community to reiterate its support for negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan without coercion. “Azerbaijan must cease its blockage of the Lachin corridor— the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to the outside world,” the Freedom House said in a tweet.
19. On December 20, 2022, The UN Security Council, based on the request of Armenia, discussed the ongoing blocking of the Lachin Corridor.
20. On December 21, 2022, the European Court of Human Rights, decided to grant Armenia’s request and indicated interim measures against Azerbaijan. The Court obliged the Government of Azerbaijan, under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court, to take all measures within its jurisdiction to ensure the safe passage of seriously ill persons needing urgent medical care in Armenia, through the Lachin corridor.
21. On December 22, 2022, the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe Ms. Dunja Mijatović called on the sides responsible for maintaining security and public order to take all necessary measures to restore the movement on the Lachin corridor urgently to prevent the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh.
22. On December 21, 2022, the Human Rights Watch stated that “Regardless of who is blocking the road, Azerbaijan’s authorities and the Russian peacekeeping force deployed there should ensure that access remains open, to enable freedom of movement and ensure people have access to essential goods and services. The longer the disruption to essential goods and services, the greater the risk to civilians”, and added that the prolonged blocking of the road can lead to dire humanitarian consequences.
23. The news about the blocking of the Lachin corridor was covered by the international press; more than two dozen articles and interviews were published about the blockade. The closure of the "road of life" of Artsakh, was addressed by a number of prestigious periodicals, such as Reuters, Radio France, Le Figaro, Opendemocracy.net and a number of other media outlets. Moreover, well-known journalists posted on their Twitter accounts. For example, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius tweeted that he held a telephone conversation with the State Minister of Artsakh Mr. Ruben Vardanyan and was informed of the situation in Artsakh.
24. The number of the publications increased specifically on December 25, when a rally was held in Artsakh. The news about the rally was disseminated by the British periodical UK Daily News, the Bulgarian bulgaria.postsen website, the Arabic website alghad.tv, and a number of notable French periodicals.
25. Numerous threats and hate speech containing publications, a large dose of Armenophobia and the fact that the representatives of the Azerbaijani public share the anti-Armenian and genocidal policies of their leaders is evidence of state-sponsored actions. "It is needless to remind that Karabakh Armenians receive electricity and gas from Armenia via cables and a pipeline that is under Azerbaijani control" commented Rasim Musabekov, deputy of the Milli Majlis on December 13. The overwhelming majority of comments in publications made by Azerbaijani social media users state that the Lachin corridor should have been closed long ago, and that the Azerbaijani authorities should have taken steps in this direction, and that Azerbaijan will do all as it wishes with the Karabakh territories, etc. Statements such as "Armenian separatists (separatists), Armenian fascists. “We should not hesitate to create our own checkpoint in the Lachin corridor." are common in the publications of Azerbaijani social media users.
26. In the backdrop of the worsening humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Jeyhun Bayramov, delivered another example of the policy of Armenophobia, accused the Armenian side of creating the impressions of the “alleged” worsening of the humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and that the Armenian authorities in Stepanakert were the ones preventing Armenians from using the Lachin corridor. This constitutes a victim-blaming pattern approach that the Azerbaijani officials are exercising as a well-established policy.
27. On December 24, 2022, while maintaining the blockade of Artsakh, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, made another Armenophobic statements, and uncovered territorial claims against Armenia, while holding a meeting with so-called representatives of “Western Azerbaijan '' (the Syunik province of the Republic of Armenia). He claimed that Armenians never had a state in the South Caucasus, and that Azerbaijanis will return to Syunik province, calling for the development of a Concept of Return.
28. It should be noted that the announcements regarding the placement of Azerbaijani customs checkpoints in the Lachin Corridor have been disseminated since September 2021, by Azerbaijani politicians and public figures.
29. On September 13, during his interview with Haqqin.az, the mouthpiece of the Azerbaijani government, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Tofig Zulfugarov stated that Azerbaijan should assume control of the checkpoint of Lachin corridor. “The peacekeepers should be told to monitor the situation in their positions of deployment, and we will protect our borders ourselves. Believe me, we will not face diplomatic scandals or cases of smuggling after that”- added the former Minister of Foreign Affairs.
30. Haqqin.az disseminated a publication which contained the statements of the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev:”The Zangezur corridor should have the same status as the Lachin corridor; if Yerevan insists on placing checkpoints of Zangezur corridor, then Baku will demand for identical conditions on Lachin corridor”.
31. Mehman Aliyev, the Director of Turan Information Agency, also referred to the Lachin Corridor, noting that control over the corridor means control over entire Nagorno Karabakh.
32. Azerbaijani media outlets often emphasize in their publications that Armenia uses the Lachin corridor for military purposes. On December 3, a group of Azerbaijanis, presenting themselves as environmental activists, had blocked the Goris-Stepanakert Road, demanding an environmental monitoring. Later, they were joined by employees of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Azerbaijan, to appeal to the Russian peacekeepers. The purpose of this act was to shape public opinion.
33. A few days before December 12, the statements on establishing Azerbaijani control over the Lachin corridor intensified. During a session of Milli Majlis (National Assembly of Azerbaijan), Deputy Fazail Rahim ogly Agamali announced that Azerbaijan should establish its own checkpoint on the corridor, While 4 days before the blocking of the corridor, the Azerbaijani Telegram channel Злой Мамед, which is known for spreading official narratives of the Azerbaijani authorities, published a photo with the comment: “How should the checkpoint of the Lachin corridor look like according to the Azerbaijanis". The photo depicts a high wall with a small hole in the middle. The above examples demonstrate that the "environmental activists" on December 12 were not spontaneous, and had deeper political roots.
34. After the blocking of the Goris-Stepanakert Road on December 12, most of the publications about it had a political context. For example, Farid Shafiyev, the Chairman of the Center of Analysis of International Relations of the Center of Analysis of International Relations, stated that the cause of the “protest” on the Lachin corridor is not only ecological problems, but the security of Lachin. He stated that Armenia uses the corridor illegally. Moreover, he insisted that Armenia was obliged to open a corridor, connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, while a Deputy of the Milli Majlis, Ali Masimli, announced that Azerbaijan should establish a customs post on the Lachin corridor. Another Azerbaijani Deputy, Jeyhun Mamedov, also stated in the Milli Majlis that the mountainous part of Karabakh, where Armenians live, should be controlled by the state bodies of Azerbaijan together with Russian peacekeepers.
35. Moreover, the state sponsorship of the “environmental protest” is not only spoken about by the speeches and statements of Milli Majlis deputies, but it is also evidenced by the speeches and statements of the President of Azerbaijan, who is supporting "environmental activists” to continue blocking the only road connecting Artsakh to Armenia.
36. On December 14, after the Azerbaijani side cut off the supply of natural gas, which is of vital importance for the residents, new was disseminated by the Azerbaijani media outlets that the reason for the disruption of the supply of the natural gas was the damages to the pipelines and the bad weather conditions. Azerigas disseminated information that Azerbaijan had nothing to do with the cut of the supply of natural gas in areas temporarily controlled by Russian peacekeepers, and noted that the issue of carrying out technical works during cold weather conditions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Jeyhun Bayramov, considered the statements about the cut of the supply of natural gas by Azerbaijan to be false: "If there was a connection between the local population and state institutions, the issue would be resolved in time”.
37. Azerbaijani analysts gave their interpretations on the problems of gas supply in Nagorno Karabakh. Since the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh is supplied with natural gas and electricity from Armenia without supply contracts and other legal formalities, the reliable supply of fuel to local residents will be ensured only by integrating the distribution network of the region with the gas supply system of Azerbaijan, according to Azerbaijani analysts who gave an interview to «Kavkaz-uzel». The analysts also noted that there is no agreement with Azerbaijan for supply of natural gas from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the analysts, the disruption of the supply of natural gas in March 2022, was resolved by Azerigaz. The analysts stated that: "It is advisable to connect the supply of natural gas to the Armenian-inhabited part of Nagorno-Karabakh to the gas supply system of Azerbaijan, after which Azerigaz as a supplier will be responsible for the operation of the system”. These publications prove once again that the cut of the supply of the natural gas supply is a part of Azerbaijani policy, and was not due to natural causes or accidents.
38. According to the information gathered by the Human Rights Defenders’ Offices, the “environmental protests” are orchestrated by the Azerbaijani authorities. The alleged “environmental protests” are widely covered by a large number of Azerbaijani journalists, who are ensuring the media coverage of “protests” in real time. Moreover, the journalists are constantly trying to provoke the Russian peacekeepers and to disrupt and discredit their mission by attempting to break through their positions of deployment, and even provoking physical confrontation.
39. Moreover, a large number of the “environmental activists” are representatives of Azerbaijani non-governmental organizations, which are directly and exclusively financed by the Azerbaijani government, or the Heydar Aliyev Foundation headed by the first vice president and first lady of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, evidence has been registered that representatives of the Azerbaijani special services are also amongst the alleged “environmental activists” who are currently blocking the only lifeline of Artsakh.
40. According to the fact-finding activities of the Human Rights Defender of Artsakh, the alleged “environmental protesters or activists” could not reach the location where they blocked the Lachin corridor on their own, without the explicit approval and authorization of the authorities of Azerbaijan.
41. Moreover, the false nature of the environmental concerns of the “protesters” blocking the Lachin corridor is revealed by their demands, which are not related to environmental concerns and issues. For example, the Azerbaijani protesters have demanded the placement of Azerbaijani checkpoints on the Lachin corridor (in violation of the November 9 trilateral statement), and for the return of Azerbaijani state bodies, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan, to the regions which are under Armenian control, and are under the protection of the Russian peacekeepers.
42. To "guarantee" the freedom of assembly of Azerbaijani "environmentalists" who blocked the vital road, new groups of "activists" in civilian clothes are being transported to the place where the “protest” is held by the Azerbaijani side.
43. Moreover, there is undeniable proof that there are servicemen of the Azerbaijani special service among the people who have blocked the road. In particular:
44. The majority of the participants of the “protest” are representatives of non-governmental organizations who are exclusively financed by the Azerbaijani state:
45. As a result of the continued blocking of the Lachin corridor by Azerbaijani alleged environmental activists, the humanitarian crisis in Artsakh has been worsening.
46. In the last 10 days, over 4000 tons of essential goods, such as grain, flour, vegetables, fruits, and medicines did not reach Artsakh through the Lachin corridor (Artsakh heavily relies on the supply of foodstuffs from Armenia to satisfy its local demand).
47. As a result, supplies in local supermarkets and stores, such as the Stepanakert’s central market have been running low. Fruits and vegetables are in short supply; there is almost the lack of sugar, buckwheat, lentils, flour, grain, olive oil, rice, and local eggs in Stepanakert. (For more photos see Annex 3)
48. As a result of the scarcity of available flour, bakeries are struggling with the production of bread to supply the market.
49. The scarcity of cash money has also been registered in Artsakh. Money withdrawals are limited from automated teller machines (ATMs), while others are completely out of service.
50. On December 25 through ICRC 10 tons of humanitarian aid was transferred to Artsakh from Armenia.
51. Humanitarian crises create complex and persistent issues related to the realization of the human right to health and healthcare. In this regard, the Azerbaijani act of blocking the Lachin corridor has created various complications in relation to the right of the civilian population of Artsakh to health and access to life-saving health care. Further aggravating the situation, and with the intention of causing a humanitarian catastrophe, the Azerbaijani authorities cut the supply of natural gas to Artsakh.
52. The provision of medicines and medications, which like foodstuffs, rely heavily on supplies from Armenia, have also been stopped. As a direct result of the blocking of the corridor, shortages of medications, such as pressure, and cardiac drugs, antibiotics, antipyretic painkillers, drugs, and other irreplaceable and essential drugs. Even the supply of medicines which are used as substitutes are ending.
53. It should be further stressed that for the urgent healthcare issues, professional medical services to patients living in Artsakh has been ensured in cooperation with the specialized medical institutions providing secondary medical care in different hospitals of Armenia, mainly in Yerevan.
54. As a direct result of the Azerbaiajni acts, the transfer of patients in critical condition for urgent treatment and hospitalization in the republican medical centers of Armenia has become impossible. According to the information registered by the Human Rights Defenders Offices, the lives of these patients are at high risk as a direct result of the Azerbaijani acts.
55. In accordance with the details provided by the Hospital of Stepanakert, one of the 5 patients that needed urgent-life saving healthcare in Yerevan died and 1 was transferred to Yerevan. On December 19, 2022, a 44-year-old patient who had been on hemodialysis and could not be transferred to a medical center in Armenia, died in Artsakh, since the patient could not revive the necessary medical care. 4 persons still remain in critical condition.
56. On December 19, the ICRC facilitated the transfer of a patient who needed urgent heart surgery in Armenia. The ambulance transferring the patient was accompanied by Russian peacekeepers and the ICRC.
57. 4 foreign citizens with chronic health issues applied to ICRC and were also evacuated from Artsakh with the support of ICRC.
58. Moreover, as a result of the cutting of the natural gas supply, medical institutions in Artsakh were deprived of the possibility to provide adequate primary health care, scheduled surgeries are temporarily halted in Artsakh medical institutions, further deteriorating the realization of the human right to health of the civilian population.
59. 9 children are in intensive and neonatal care. According to the Ministry of Health of Artsakh, the 4-month-old infant is suffering from a potentially fatal case of visceral Leishmaniasis, and continues to remain in critical condition. On December 24, the international Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) facilitated the transfer of the infant to a specialized institution in Armenia. The ambulance was accompanied by a convoy of ICRC and Russian peacekeepers.
60. A civilian population in need is entitled to receive humanitarian relief essential to its survival, in accordance with international humanitarian law. States are under the obligation to allow the free passage of relief that is of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and is indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.
61. Article 23 of GCIV prescribes the obligation for each High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores (...) only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.
62. At the same time, Article 70 of API states that: “1. If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, (...). In the distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be accorded privileged treatment or special protection. 2. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the adverse Party.”
63. Under the Article 18.2 of APII, if the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.
64. During humanitarian crises, such as the one currently developing in Artsakh, children are amongst the most vulnerable groups. Therefore, their rights and interests require specific attention. The right to security, right to education and right to life with a family were violated.
65. According to the information gathered by the Human Rights Defenders’ Offices, 270 children, about 70 of them without their parents (they were attending the Junior Eurovision Song Contest which was being held in Armenia, being accompanied by their teachers) were not able to pass through the Lachin corridor back home. These children are now accommodated in Goris, Syunik province and in Yerevan.
66. The office of the HRD of Armenia continues monitoring the situation and carrying out need assessments. The needs of 55 children without parents and 10 adults residing in Armenia have been addressed in cooperation with and with the support of NGOs and international organizations.
67. As mentioned earlier, more than 9 children are in intensive and neonatal care deprived of the opportunity to be transferred to Armenia.
68. As stated above, the right to education of the children of Artsakh has been disrupted as well on December 14-16. The heating problem has greatly affected the normal functioning of the educational process in Artsakh, as there are a large number of gas-heated educational institutions - kindergartens, schools, secondary vocational, and higher education institutions.
69. Under Article 79 of API, part 1, four categories of persons who must be given priority are specifically mentioned. In particular, in the distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases, and nursing mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be accorded privileged treatment or special protection.
70. In addition, the right to education should be ensured under all circumstances and protected in all situations, including crises and emergencies resulting from civil strife and war. Moreover, the GCIV states that “Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.” (Article 50).